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Abstract: The Italian Health care System provides universal coverage for
comprehensive health services and is mainly ﬁnanced through general taxation.
Since the early 1990s, a strong decentralization policy has been adopted in Italy
and the state has gradually ceded its jurisdiction to regional governments, of which
there are twenty. These regions now have political, administrative, ﬁscal and
organizational responsibility for the provision of health care. This paper examines
the different governance models that the regions have adopted and investigates the
performance evaluation systems (PESs) associated with them, focusing on the
experience of a network of ten regional governments that share the same PES. The
article draws on the wide range of governance models and PESs in order to design a
natural experiment. Through an analysis of 14 indicators measured in 2007 and in
2012 for all the regions, the study examines how different performance evaluation
models are associated with different health care performances and whether the
network-shared PES has made any difference to the results achieved by the regions
involved. The initial results support the idea that systematic benchmarking and
public disclosure of data are powerful tools to guarantee the balanced and
sustained improvement of the health care systems, but only if they are integrated
with the regional governance mechanisms.
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1. Introduction
Following the wave of the international New Public Management movement
(Hood, 1991), many health care systems underwent reforms in the 1990s to shift
control from the national to the local level, and thus increase the scope for ﬂex-
ibility in local governance (Fattore, 1999; Saltman et al., 2007). Since then,
reforms based on New Public Management principles have been aimed at
making the public sector more efﬁcient, effective and accountable (Hood, 1995;
Lapsley, 1999; Saltman et al., 2007). Some countries have introduced quasi-
market mechanisms to foster competition. Others have focused on measuring
performance, which has become a mantra at all levels of government since the
1990s (Radin, 2000). As a consequence, health systems and institutions have
adopted different strategies and governance models with a particular interest in
measurement tools and techniques. Initially, performance measurement focused
on ﬁnancial issues and neglected multiple strategic objectives to drive change
(Ghobadian and Ashworth, 1994; Pollitt and Bouckaert 1995; Guthrie and Eng-
lish, 1997; Lorden et al., 2008). Thus, comprehensive multi-dimensional perfor-
mance measurement frameworks, such as the balanced scorecard, were introduced
(Kloot and Martin, 2000; Yang and Tung, 2006). Another development was the
benchmarking of health performance measurement systems at international, national
and local levels (NHS Executive, 1999; Pink et al., 2001; Johnston, 2004; Vainieri
andNuti, 2011). Benchmarking can helpmanagers learn frombest practices (McNair
and Leibfried, 1992) and be used as a mechanism to detect unwarranted variations
and encourage their reduction (Arah et al., 2003).
We argue here that to drive health care system improvements at national or
local levels, the performance evaluation system should be aligned with the
national (or sub-national for local governments) strategy, mission and vision in
order to provide coherent messages for those running the units and their
employees (as suggested by Ferreira and Otley, 2009).
Relying on previous studies (Cromwell et al., 2011; Brown et al., 2012; Bevan
and Fasolo, 2013; Bevan and Wilson, 2013), we identify ﬁve governance models:
1. The ‘trust and altruism’ model relies on the perspective that all public servants
behave like knights. This was the traditional model applied by the National
Healthcare System (NHS) and does not focus on success and failure. On the
contrary, it may reward failure and ignore success.
2. The ‘choice and competition’ model is based on the quasi-market system where
patients can choose and the money follows the patients. This model introduces
external incentives, and patients (or insurance companies) can choose providers
on the basis of quality information.
3. The ‘hierarchy and targets’model, also known as ‘command and control’, is based
on recourse to external incentives and the strong role of performance management
(generally by the central government). It has side effects such as high monitoring
costs and low acceptance by professionals.
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4. The ‘transparent public ranking’ model is based on the lever of reputation. This
model has been applied in England, where it is known as the ‘naming and
shaming’ model.
5. The ‘pay for performance’ (P4P) model draws upon economic incentives to direct
the managers’ behaviour. Regarding the speciﬁc use of the expression ‘pay for
performance’ in this paper, the Italian regional governments that adopt the ‘P4P’
model link the rewarding scheme of their health authorities’ (HAs) CEOs to the
performance they achieve. This model is based on the assumption that ﬁnancial
payments can motivate people to achieve performance targets. It aims to improve
quality and efﬁciency by paying more for results or actions such as evidence-based
preventive care services, or denying payment for preventable complications.
These governance models can be adopted at the macro level by the state, at the
meso level by regions (or counties and provinces, depending on a country’s
organization) and at the micro level by local institutions (municipalities, health
care authorities, hospitals, etc.). The basic ingredients of the ﬁve ‘ideal typical’
models can be mixed. For instance, Bevan and Fasolo (2013) have described the
‘star rating’ model, which was applied by the English NHS from 2000 to 2005, as
a combination of the third and fourth models.
This paper discusses which governance models have been adopted by the Italian
regions (themeso level) and their impact on performance. The paper ﬁrst classiﬁes the
regions using the ﬁve governance models described above. Second, it describes the
Inter-Regional Performance Evaluation System (IRPES), which is an evaluation tool
currently adopted by a network of 10 Italian regions and how this was used in terms
of a governance model between 2006 and 2012. Third, this paper examines how the
performance of the regions changed between 2007 and 2012. The paper concludes by
discussing the outcomes of the different governance models adopted by the regions
and, in particular, how IRPES has, or has not, driven improvement in the network.
2. The governance systems adopted by Italian regions in the
health care sector
The ItalianNHS, which follows the Beveridgemodel, is a public health system that
provides universal coverage for comprehensive and essential health services
through general taxation. Since the early 1990s, a strong decentralization policy
has been adopted in Italy and the state has gradually ceded its jurisdiction to its 20
regions (France and Taroni, 2005).1
The central level – represented by both the Ministry of Health and the Ministry
of Finance – ensures that the regions keep their health care expenditure within
their budgets and guarantees the essential levels of care. Since the 2000s, the
health care budget has been allocated to the regions on the basis of a per capita
1 Legislative Decrees 502/1992 and 517/1993 paved the way for the gradual devolution of health care
powers to the regions. The Constitutional Law 3, 18 October 2001 amended articles 114 to 133 of the
Italian Constitution and institutionalized regional jurisdiction over the health care sector.
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share, partially adjusted by the age distribution of the population. On the other
hand, the regions are in charge of organizing health care services. They deﬁne their
own regional health plans, coordinate the strategies of the regional HAs, and
allocate the budget within their systems. Since 2000, the regions have become
more ﬁscally autonomous andmore ﬁnancially responsible (Ferrario and Zanardi,
2011; Ferrè et al., 2012).2
Italian regions now have the political, administrative and ﬁnancial responsi-
bility for the provision of health care to their residents.
De Vries (2000) argued that the results of decentralization depend on the cul-
tural and political context, on the administrative capabilities of the actors involved
and on how the process is promoted (see also Putnam, 1993). The consequence is
that there are now 20 regional health care systems (RHSs) in Italy with different
governance models and management tools (Formez, 2007; Censis, 2008; Tediosi
et al., 2009; Vainieri and Nuti, 2011; Carinci et al., 2012; Mapelli, 2012). France
et al. (2005) highlighted the north–south performance disparities in mortality,
expenditure and equity up until 2002. About 10 years later, Toth (2014) reviewed
the ﬁrst decade of Italian decentralization (1999–2009) and concluded that the
shift of power from the central to the regional level had accentuated the north-
south divide, in terms of expenditure and perceived quality of health care services.
The high degree of geographical variation in various measures of performance
demonstrates that these general conditions and quality/volume standards are not
equally achieved among the Italian regions. Such variation is common in health
care systems (Wennberg and Gittelsohn, 1973; Wennberg, 1999; Wennberg et al.,
2002; Appleby et al., 2011; Corallo et al., 2014; EuroHOPE, 2014; OECD, 2014).
During the ﬁrst years of devolution (2001–2005), the central government bailed
out the previous health care deﬁcits of the regions. In order to prevent increasing
deﬁcits, the Italian government approved legislation that introduced a new
recovery process to reduce the ﬁnancial deﬁcit of the RHSs (Bordignon and Turati,
2009; Ferrè et al., 2012). The Financial Stability Law L. 311 (30 December 2004)
and the Financial Stability Law L. 296 (27 December 2006) regulated the design
and the adoption of the recovery plans.3
The laws decree that if the regions are in deﬁcit – even with extra ﬁnance from
regional taxes – they have the right to access a bail out fund, ﬁnanced by national
taxation. To access this fund, the regions are required by the central government
to produce a recovery plan, which should identify strategic actions to address the
2 Decree Law 56/2000 abolished the national health fund and directly allocated taxes to the regions. A
‘national equalization fund’ was set up to counterbalance differences in regional GDP. Regions are
accountable for covering their deﬁcit with their own resources, which include regional taxes and
co-payments for health care services.
3 The Financial Stability Law L. 296 (27 December 2006) enforced the pact (Patto per la Salute) that the
Italian government and the regional governments had signed on 5 October 2006. The health care funding
for the period 2007–2009 was slightly increased and extra funds were allocated to cover 2006 deﬁcits.
A speciﬁc fund was created for those regions with high deﬁcits, i.e, >7% of the funding (Tediosi et al., 2009;
Ferrè et al., 2012).
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structural determinants of the costs involved in achieving ﬁnancial balance (Ferrè
et al., 2012). These recovery plans are subject to approval by theNationalMinistry of
Health and by the Ministry of Economy and Finance. If the plans are deemed
inadequate, the President of the region is formally replaced by an ‘ad acta commis-
sioner’, that the law states to be the president himself, and regional taxes have to be
automatically increased up to a predeﬁned threshold. Since 2007, 10 out of 20 RHSs
have carried out a recovery plan: Abruzzo, Molise, Apulia (since 2010), Campania,
Calabria (since 2009), Sicily, Lazio, Piedmont (since 2010), Sardinia and Liguria. In
ﬁve of these RHSs, the central government has nominated a commissioner in charge
of local implementation. So far, Liguria and Sardinia have successfully implemented
their recovery plans with a balanced budget (these regions have succeeded by real-
locating ﬁnancial resources from other public sectors to health care).
We now describe the models of governance adopted by each region, illustrating
how the regions combined the ﬁve above-mentioned ‘ideal typical’ models from
2007 to 2012. We identiﬁed four groups of regions, according to how they mixed
the ﬁve governance models.
First, Lombardy is the only region that opted for the ‘choice and competition’
model by splitting purchasers and providers (including private institutions) in
order to stress the role of patient choice to boost competition (Lombardy Region,
1997). The principal tools adopted by Lombardy to manage its services are
represented by (a) tariffs; (b) the adoption of the Joint Commission International
Accreditation Program for Hospital Care (JCI, 2014); (c) hospital care outcomes
and patient satisfaction (Vittadini, 2012). General managers of the LHAs are
rewarded according to the achievement of targets negotiated with the regional
administration.4 Lombardy, therefore, combines some elements of the ‘choice and
competition’ model (tariffs and patient choice) with ‘pay for performance’.
However, despite the link between CEO rewards and performance results, the
variability in managers’ results and the related economic incentives is low, thus
weakening the P4P strategy as a governance tool (Vainieri et al., 2013). Finally,
although Lombardy measures outcomes in benchmarks, it does not fully disclose the
results either to the hospitals, or to the patients. Lombardy hospitals are the only ones
to know their own results, without knowing how they comparewith each other. They
therefore cannot identify and learn from the best practices (Vittadini, 2011; Berta
et al., 2013). Moreover, despite the alleged stress on patient choice, Lombardy does
not use transparent public ranking and does not publicly disclose results.
4 The Lombardy regional Healthcare Directorate, in collaboration with the Interuniversity Research
Centre on Public Services, in 2002 started developing a set of performance measurements to systematically
evaluate the performance of health care providers in terms of the quality of care. This set of indicators
comprises: (1) intra-hospital mortality, (2) mortality within 30 days after discharge, (3) overall mortality
(intra-hospital plus within 30 days mortality), (4) voluntary hospital discharges, (5) readmission to an
operating room, (6) inter-hospital transfer of patients and (7) readmission for the same major diagnostic
categories (Formez, 2007; Vainieri and Nuti, 2011; Vittadini, 2011; Berta et al., 2013).
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Second, the ‘hierarchy and targets’ (or ‘command and control’) model has been
applied by the state for the following eight regions that are still subject to recovery
plans: Abruzzo, Molise, Apulia, Campania, Calabria, Sicily, Lazio and Piedmont.
Although the central government speciﬁes ﬁnancial targets for all of them, the
response differs according to the previous governance models and the managerial
skills of the staff. Irrespectively of these differences, none of these eight regions nor
the state, systematically benchmark the clinical results between regions, nor do
they publicly disclose data.
Recent studies in Italy on top management evaluation systems have highlighted
that the setting of targets phase in these regions does not follow objective and
rational processes (Caldarelli et al., 2013; Vainieri et al., 2013). Indeed, they often
do not take into consideration past performance and largely depend on qualitative
targets, which are usually vague and can be interpreted in different ways (Vainieri
et al., 2013). Moreover, these regions lack a reliable supervision and monitoring
system (Ferrè et al., 2012). Sanctions for failure are therefore not clearly applied
and the ‘hierarchy and targets’ (or ‘command and control’) model appears to be
applied loosely. Thus, the difference with the ‘trust and altruism’ model (which is
not formally adopted by any Italian region) is blurred.
Third, since 2006 Tuscany and an increasing number of regions (10 regions in
2014) have adopted a mixed governance model that combines ‘hierarchy and
targets’ with ‘transparent public ranking’ (in the form of public disclosure of
performance data) and ‘pay for performance’ (limited to the CEOs’ rewarding
schemes). This mixed model has been adopted at different times between 2007
and 2014 by Tuscany, Liguria, Umbria, Basilicata, Trento, Bolzano, Marche,
Veneto, Emilia Romagna and Friuli.
In addition, another two regions – the Aosta Valley and Piedmont – joined the
Tuscan Performance Evaluation System for three years, from 2008 to 2010. As
previously mentioned, Piedmont partially lost its autonomy when it shifted to the
command and control model, with the strong role of central government, while
the Aosta Valley went back to its regional model of hierarchy and targets, mainly
focused on epidemiological issues. The Aosta Valley has disclosed performance
results to internal users rather than to the public. These results are not always
translated into policy decisions (Carinci et al., 2012).
Fourth, Emilia Romagna, Veneto and Friuli have only recently opted for the
governance model suggested by Tuscany. Before 2014, they had applied mixed
governance models in different ways (Vainieri and Nuti, 2011; Carinci et al., 2012).
Between 2007 and 2012, all three regions used some performance evaluation
mechanisms regarding several dimensions. For instance, Friuli linked health data-
bases, delivering detailed reports and regular publications for internal users. Veneto
conducted patient surveys, and Emilia Romagna conducted self-evaluation cycles,
involving health professionals (Vainieri and Nuti, 2011; Carinci et al., 2012).
However, these tools were not systematically used in regional decision making and
their performance was not benchmarked against the other regions’ performance.
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In conclusion, no regional government in Italy can be considered to have
adopted one single clear-cut governance model, but rather a combination of them.
In this context, the experience of the regions that have adopted the same Per-
formance Evaluation System is worth examining.
2.1 The network experience
Since 2008, a growing number of regions have adopted the same IRPES, which
was designed and implemented for the ﬁrst time in 2005 in all of Tuscany’s local
health authorities (LHAs) by the Laboratorio Management e Sanità (MeS) of the
Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna to measure and monitor indicators of quality, efﬁ-
ciency, appropriateness, continuity of care, patient satisfaction and staff satisfac-
tion (Nuti and Bonini, 2011, 2013; Nuti et al., 2013). In 2014, there were 10
regions in the network: Basilicata, Liguria, Marche, the Autonomous province of
Bolzano, the Autonomous province of Trento, Toscana, Umbria, Veneto, Emilia
Romagna and Friuli Venezia Giulia. The regions joined the network in different
years, as reported in Figure 1.
The Laboratorio MeS develops the performance evaluation framework and
brings objectivity to the benchmarking processes as an independent research unit.
It coordinates and manages information sharing and data acquisition. The
10 regions in the network agree on the indicators for the benchmarking and on
how they should be calculated. Each region is responsible for processing its own
data, in order to increase the awareness and the expertise of the regional managers
and their staff.
The aim of the IRPES is to assess and monitor health system performance at a
regional and local level: the results are shown by region and by HAs (both LHAs
and teaching hospitals). In 2014, IRPES monitored the performance of 99 HAs.
The regional network integrates a longitudinal (the trend) with a cross-sectional
perspective, based on the benchmarking process. It provides the regions with













Figure 1. Regional adhesion to Inter-Regional Performance Evaluation System (IRPES).
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valuable information in order to deﬁne priorities and ﬁx appropriate targets,
considering the results in benchmarking. In addition, given that they follow the
same PES, the regions can evaluate, share and spread best practices.
Indicators are deﬁned by endorsing a ‘managerial’ perspective aimed at orga-
nizational improvement (Mannion and Davies, 2008). The rationale behind
the selection of each indicator is the informational contribution it can offer
the managers and policy makers. Indicators are chosen not only because they
represent the epidemiological situation of single regions/Local Authorities,
but because they also detect best (organizational) practices or, on the contrary,
ﬂawed clinical processes.5
Indicators are deﬁned in regular meetings with regional representatives that include
both managers and clinicians. For an evaluation system to be able to inﬂuence and
change behaviours, it must actually win support from clinicians on the rules and
criteria their performance is measured against (Locke and Latham, 2013).
PES encompasses a large set of indicators that are up-to-date because they are
calculated and disseminated in a six-month period. The indicators are grouped
into 60 indexes and classiﬁed in six dimensions (a letter is used to indicate each
dimension):
A. Population health.
B. Regional strategy compliance, to guarantee that strategic regional goals are
pursued in the time and manner indicated.
C. Quality, appropriateness, continuity of care, patient safety and managing supply
to match demand.
D. Patient satisfaction, the patients’ experience and level of satisfaction with health
services.
E. Staff satisfaction, results of surveys on the satisfaction level of staff with their
working conditions and management.
F. Efﬁciency and ﬁnancial performance.
PES measures results in quantitative terms and then assesses performance for
100 of the 160 indicators: excellent, good, sufﬁcient, poor or very poor. These ﬁve
evaluation tiers are associated with different colours, from dark green (excellent
performance), to red (poor). Regions use the same reference standards for eva-
luation, based on the scientiﬁc literature, national standards or, where these are
5 As an example, the timeliness of the surgical treatment for femur-fractured patients can be monitored
in different ways, including or excluding speciﬁc segments of the population. The highest incidence of
fractures refers to people older than 65 and the epidemiological perspective focuses on this cohort,
measuring the percentage of femur fractures operated on within two days after the hospital admission
among patients older than 65. When used as a performance indicator, however, it overlooks patients
younger than 65 and could potentially trigger opportunistic behaviours among clinicians, who might be
incentivized to postpone interventions for younger patients in order to achieve the target. By endorsing a
‘managerial’ perspective, IRPES chose to include all the patients in the computation of the indicator, in order
to prevent these kinds of side effects.
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lacking, on the median of the 99 HAs. Figure 2, as an example, displays the
indicator of femur fractures operated on within two days.
In order to show the performance of each region or HA, a chart with the six
dimensions is used (see Figure 3). The chart is also divided into ﬁve evaluation
bands, associated with different scores and colours as explained above. Each
indicator is positioned on the chart and there is no overall unique ranking for
Figure 2. Percentage of femur fractures operated on within two days.
Figure 3. The ‘dartboard’.
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regions/HAs. When the result has a high score, it is displayed close to the centre
(dark green), and when the score is low, it is displayed far from the centre (red).
The number of indicators varies by region, because each region chooses which
ones to include, with reference to local context and strategies. However, there is a
core group of indicators that all the regions consider mandatory for the main
pillars of the health care system. Indeed, the majority of indicators are common to
all the regions because the main objectives are the same at the national level. The
IRPES structure also allows regions to choose different indicators to reﬂect the
different regional strategies. The inclusion of a speciﬁc indicator within IRPES
signals the strategic relevance the indicator is deemed to have, for all the regions or
for a subset of them.
From the beginning, the regional network agreed on transparency for public
accountability. An annual performance report is published and the web platform
where data are stored is public (http://performance.sssup.it/network). The report
includes all the regions, and local performance (HAs) is also shown.
There are regular meetings between the regional representatives to share the
results of the assessment system, identify best practices and compare outcomes of
different regional strategies. The systematic reporting of comparisons of perfor-
mance that IRPES provides, may result in some element of competition among the
regions. Working groups are established as issues arise to discuss the different
impacts of policies and to develop new indicators.
3. IRPES as a governance tool
Several governance models can exploit IRPES data (Brown et al., 2012; Nuti et al.,
2013). With reference to the ﬁve above-mentioned ‘ideal typical’ models:
1. IRPESs can be linked to strategic planning and HAs’ goal setting so that it is integral
to political accountability. The IRPES provides a basis for regions to identify priorities
and to set challenging targets. It can therefore be used as a tool to sanction managers
according to their performance (‘hierarchy and target’ governance model).
2. IRPESs can be linked to the CEOs’ ﬁnancial reward system. Indeed, it is largely
acknowledged that reward schemes reinforce orientation and directions. Hence,
performance indicators monitored and assessed by IRPES can be included in CEO
schemes in order to better align CEO objectives with those of the institution and of
the health care system in general (‘pay for performance’ governance model).
3. Regions can use IRPES information as an improvement tool to leverage their
reputation, by publicly disclosing data to all the stakeholders within the regional
health system (‘transparent public ranking’ governance model). Regions can
disseminate results through public events, such as press conferences, meetings and
internal periodic monitoring. To enable peer reviewmechanisms, the performance
results can be discussed in all kinds of contexts such as managerial training
activities for top and middle management, in order to stimulate feedback from
professionals who are the basic operators of change.
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4. IRPES can be used as a tool to align the three above-mentioned governance
mechanisms (mainly addressed to managers) to the operative units of the RHSs.
IRPES results can also be integrated within the budgeting process of HAs.
The integration and the joint adoption of all these strategies provide a boost to
improve performance, as demonstrated by the comparison of Lazio and Tuscany
regarding hip fractures operated on within two days (Pinnarelli et al., 2012).
We now describe how IRPES-adhering regions have integrated the PES with
their internal governance mechanisms in different ways.
Tuscany and Basilicata are currently using all four strategies, and Veneto,
Emilia Romagna and Friuli seem to be on the same track. Piedmont has also
applied all four strategies but only when it participated in the network.
Trento, Liguria and Umbria, have adopted three of the four strategies. Trento
has linked IRPES to other governance tools (strategy 1), CEO reward schemes
(strategy 2) and both internal and public events (strategy 3). Full integration in the
local budget process is still lacking. Liguria has also applied the ﬁrst three strate-
gies but in a non-systematic way. Finally, Umbria has adopted the ﬁrst two stra-
tegies and partially introduced IRPES in its managerial training programmes.
Finally, Bolzano, Marche and the Aosta Valley have not endorsed any of the
aforementioned four strategies. Table 1 summarizes the different governance
models adopted by the regions in 2007–2012.
4. Methodology
To compare the results achieved by the regions with different governance models,
we chose 14 performance indicators measured in 2007 and in 2012 (see Table 2).
These speciﬁc indicators were chosen because they had already been validated
by the pilot study coordinated by the MeS Laboratory in 2009, on behalf of
the Italian Ministry of Health (Nuti et al., 2012). Most of the indicators were
derived from the framework already developed by the Tuscany region or from
international studies (Canadian Institute for Health Information, 2001; OECD,
2003; WHO, 2003; AHRQ, 2006; Department of Health, 2008) and they were
selected on the basis of the following criteria (Kelley and Hurst, 2006):
∙ relevance in terms of policy;
∙ scientiﬁc soundness of the indicators in terms of their validity and reliability;
∙ feasibility of obtaining nationally comparable data;
∙ ability to provide a comprehensive overview of hospital, primary and preventive
care in the Italian health care system.
The national hospital discharge database for the years 2007 and 2012 was used
for all the measurements on hospital and primary care dimensions. The 2007 and
2012 OsMed reports were used for the indicators on pharmaceutical care
(OsMed, 2007; OsMed, 2012). The 2007 and 2012 national screening reports
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Aosta Valley ✓ ✓
Apulia ✓ ✓
Autonomous Province of Bolzano ✓
Autonomous Province of Trento ✓ ✓ ✓




Friuli-Venezia Giulia ✓ ✓
Lazio ✓ ✓ ✓




Piedmont ✓ ✓ ✓
Sardinia ✓ ✓
Sicily ✓ ✓
Tuscany ✓ ✓ ✓
Umbria ✓ ✓ ✓
Veneto ✓ ✓
Table 2. Set of selected indicators
Indicator code Indicator label
Hospital care (H)
H1 Ordinary hospitalization rate
H3 Percentage of medical DRG from surgical departments
H4 Percentage of laparoscopic cholecystectomies in day surgery or 0–1-day admissions
H5 Surgical essential levels of health services DRG – standard percentage achieved
H9 Percentage of caesarean births
H11 Percentage of femur fractures operated within 2 days
H13 Preoperative average hospital stay
H14 Percentage of short medical hospitalizations
Primary care (T)
T2 Hospitalization rate for heart failure (50–74 years old)
T3 Hospitalization rate for diabetes (20–74 years old)
T4 Hospitalization rate for COPD (50–74 years old)
AF5 Per capita net pharmaceutical expenditure
Preventive care (P)
P3 Mammography screening extension
P4 Compliance with mammography screening
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were used for the measurements on prevention (National Screening Observatory,
2014). Preventable hospitalization rates for chronic conditions from inpatients
data were used as a proxy of primary care performance because of the lack of
national comparable sources on territorial services (Ricketts et al., 2001). Indi-
cators from hospital inpatient data, when possible, were standardized according
to sex and age, using Italian residents in 2001 as a standard population.
The indicators refer to two years – 2007 and 2012 – and provide information
for a pre–post comparison: IRPES was actually ﬁrst developed in 2008.
All the selected indicators were considered by the IRPES regions to have the
same importance in measuring the performance of the RHS. This set of indicators
therefore offers a preliminary overview of the differences across regional health
care performances and how they shifted in the 2007–2012 period.6
In order to summarize regional performances in 2007 and 2012, the 14 indi-
cators were combined into a single indicator according to the following
methodology:
∙ we ranked each indicator for each year (2007 and 2012);
∙ we assigned the quintile each region occupied for each speciﬁc indicator;
∙ coefﬁcients ranging from 0.2 (worst performing), 0.4 (badly), 0.6 (average), 0.8
(well) to 1 (best) were then assigned. For each region, the weighted indicators
were ﬁrst summed and then divided by 14 (the total number of indicators),
obtaining a performance score that hypothetically ranged from 0.2 (all the 14
indicators in the worst quintile) to 1 (all the 14 indicators in the best quintile).
This procedure was applied both to the 2007 and 2012 indicators.
The overall performance score is the mean of the 14 (ranked and weighted)
indicators. Although we limited ourselves to 14 indicators in devising the
performance score, this was supported by the decision of all the IRPES regions to
consider the indicators as equally important and relevant in terms of offering
an overview of performance of the RHSs. In addition, according to the
national legislative framework, the three health care levels – hospital, primary
and preventive care – should be ﬁnanced according to ﬁxed shares (respectively:
44, 51 and 5%), which mirror their respective importance (State-regional
Conference, 2009; Presidency of the Republic of Italy, 2011). The proportion of
the selected indicators approximately reﬂects this balance (although slightly
overestimating the importance of hospital care). Finally, note that the overall
performance score is not conceived as a tool to rank the regions, but as an
explanatory expedient used to offer an overview of their performance in the
2007–2012 period.
First, the method allows for cross-regional comparisons, regardless of the scale
of each indicator, and offers an overview of the performances of the RHSs.
Second, it allows for longitudinal comparisons (2012 vs 2007) that are not
6 The replication data set can be accessed via the electronic version of Health Economics, Policy and
Law.
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affected by different regional starting points in 2007 and by events at a national
level, as trends are assessed in relative terms, in relation to all those of the regions.
Figures 4 and 5 show the regional performances in 2007 and in 2012. Figure 4
overviews each region’s performance in 2007 and 2012, by listing the number of
indicators according to the quintile they occupied.
The dynamics of each region’s relative performance is shown by Figure 5. The
blue line shows the 2007 score; the green and red lines portray each region’s
improvement or lack of, respectively, between 2007 and 2012.
Figure 5. Regional performance.
Figure 4. Regional performances in 2007 and in 2012.
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The above-mentioned methodology and its graphic representation offer some
preliminary insights into impact of the different governance models adopted by
the regions on performance and the relevance of the IRPES tool. The variability in
the governance models adopted in accordance with the above-mentioned decen-
tralization process, actually provides a natural experiment to study the association
of regional health care performances with different governance models.
Other regional variables might be associated with health care performance and
could be a confounding factor for our analysis. The Italian regions have histori-
cally been heterogeneous in terms of size, population, economic development,
civic culture and institutional performance, with a very clear difference between
the north and the south of the country (Putnam, 1993; Cotta and Verzichelli,
2007; Pavolini and Vicarelli, 2012; Toth, 2014). From an economic point of
view, despite the substantial difference between the northern regions (with a per
capita income of 27,500 euros in 2012) and the southern regions (18,200 euros),
this disparity is not reﬂected in their public health spending (Istat, 2012). As
mentioned above, since the 2000s, the health care budget has been allocated
among the regions on the basis of a per capita share, partially adjusted by the age
distribution of the population. Therefore, all regions are roughly guaranteed the
same per capita resources for health care (Toth, 2014).
5. Discussion
In Section 2, we grouped the Italian regions into four clusters, according to how
they mixed the ﬁve ‘ideal typical’ governance models previously outlined. We will
now discuss the performance of each group in 2007–2012, according to the
methodology explained in Section 4.
As already mentioned, Lombardy is the only region that adopted a ‘choice and
competition’ governance model. According to the 14 indicators we considered,
this governance system does not seem to be associated with outstanding perfor-
mances in 2012, or with exceptional improvement. Lombardy actually performed
slightly better in 2012 than the other regions but had actually got worse compared
with 2007. Hospital-related performance seems to be detrimentally affected by
this governance model, both regarding appropriateness (H3, H4, H5) and quality
indicators (H9 and H11). Both the regions with a ‘trust and altruism’/‘hierarchy
and targets’ governance model (debt-rescheduling plan) and those that chose to
adhere to a ‘hierarchy and targets’/‘transparent public ranking’/‘pay for perfor-
mance’ (IRPES) show different performances, suggesting that governance models
can be applied differently and may be affected by other regional characteristics.
Regions with a recovery plan (group 2) generally show a poor performance in
2007 and some degree of improvement from 2007 to 2012. Hence, it seems that
the strict commitment of the central government to setting targets and controlling
their achievement has pushed regions towards improving their performance.
However, there are doubts as to the real effectiveness of the regional recovery
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plans, which are more oriented towards ﬁnancial expenditure and hospital per-
formance rather than the quality of services. Sicily and Piedmont represent two
interesting cases. Sicily registered one of the worst performances in 2007 but
achieved a signiﬁcant improvement from 2007 to 2012. However, the analysis of
single indicators shows that improvements almost uniquely refer to hospital care
indicators. Primary and preventive care, which were poor in 2007, did not sig-
niﬁcantly improve in 2012 and the same goes for pharmaceutical expenditure.
On the one hand, Sicily’s improvement may be due to the introduction
of a clause in top managers’ contracts, which required the achievement of
speciﬁc performance targets linked to the national outcome evaluation program
(PNE) run by AGENAS (the National Agency for Regional Health Services).
Target achievement is one of the conditions needed to have appointments con-
ﬁrmed: the commitment to strict ‘hierarchy and targets’models therefore seems to
be associated with a signiﬁcant performance improvement. The Sicilian case
suggests that ‘hierarchy and targets’ models prove to be more effective in dealing
with hospital care re-organization, where structural reforms require strong poli-
tical commitment, while it might be more difﬁcult to deal with primary and
preventive care.
On the other hand, these results seem to conﬁrm the ﬁndings of Ferrè et al. on
the above-mentioned evaluation of regional recovery plans (Ferrè et al., 2012).
Complex systems may entail the hierarchy model being integrated with different
governance models (e.g. ‘transparent public ranking’ and ‘pay for performance’)
that help align the different goals of the powerful players with regional goals.
Piedmont is a northern region that has generally shown high-quality perfor-
mances. It adhered to the IRPES network in 2008 and left it in 2010, when it
entered the debt-rescheduling plan. Despite the recovery plan, it seems that the
Piedmont health care system was able to ensure increasing quality performances.
Indeed, the region improved hospital performances (see indicators H4, H11, H13)
conﬁrming, at the same time, its excellent primary care. IRPES-adopting regions
(group 3) showed different internal patterns. They were, in general, characterized
by higher performances (both in 2007 and in 2012) than the regions with recovery
plans, however, they showed signiﬁcant variability, especially in their dynamics.
The two regions that improved the most were Basilicata and Tuscany.
Regarding Basilicata, single indicators highlight more balanced dynamics than
Sicily. There were improvements in the three assistance levels (hospital, primary
and preventive care), although a couple of hospital-care indicators – referring to
appropriateness – worsened (H3 and H5).
The second interesting case is Tuscany. This region registered a high perfor-
mance in 2007 and was still offering good general assistance in 2012, even
improving some hospital and primary care processes (H3, H11, H13, T2).
These two regions (Basilicata and Tuscany) have integrated the IRPESwith their
governance tools more than the other regions, combining various elements of the
‘hierarchy and targets’ model with elements of ‘transparent public ranking’ and
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‘pay for performance’. Information provided by IRPES has been used to set HA
targets and deﬁne priorities, linking them with the CEO reward management
systems. Basilicata and Tuscany publicly disclose their results and disseminate
them at the local level through meetings and training programmes for profes-
sionals. Marche had a similar performance to Tuscany in 2007, but showed an
opposite trend between 2007 and 2012. Its hospital care declined, in terms of
appropriateness and quality (H4, H5, H11). This is probably due to a continuous
reorganization carried out at the local level and a different approach towards
performance evaluation.
A comparison between the autonomous provinces of Trento and Bolzano probably
provides the most interesting ﬁndings. As Figures 4 and 5 show, the two regions
present a similar successful 2007 performance, but with opposite trends, despite
similar geographic conditions. They embraced a rather different approach towards
performance evaluation: only Trento systematically disclosed and shared data
through public meetings, while Bolzano only started in 2014. The different models
adopted seem to have affected hospital care appropriateness/efﬁciency and primary
care. Bolzano’s ability to efﬁciently manage its hospital processes and to divert
demand towards the primary care setting seems to have worsened. Trento jointly
improved its hospital, primary care and prevention performance. Again, it could be
that a combination of ‘hierarchy and targets’/‘transparent public ranking’/‘pay for
performance’ governance models are associated with a balanced improvement path.
Umbria and Aosta Valley did not disseminate their IRPES results and they
poorly linked the system with other mechanisms, as reported in Section 2. Indeed,
their performances have got steadily worse.
Liguria did not use the IRPES in a systematic way, and only slightly improved its
2007 performance.
Finally, the group of regions that adopted a mixed model of governance (group 4)
did not benchmark their results against the other regions and only partially disclosed
their results. Emilia Romagna, Veneto and Friuli (all of them joined the network
after 2012) registered a very high performance in 2007, which declined in 2012
(with the exception of Veneto, which maintained its starting position). This sug-
gests that the mixed model of ‘hierarchy and targets’/‘pay for performance’ alone
is not enough to ensure that the high-performing regions keep improving. External
benchmarking and public disclosure of data could be a valid incentive to activate
peer review processes, reputation pressure and emulate best practices.
6. Conclusions
This research draws upon the organizational autonomy Italian regions have been
granted since 2001 in order to assess whether different governance models are
systematically associated with different performances in the health care sector.
None of the regions endorsed a single clear-cut governance model – most com-
bined the ﬁve ideal typical models outlined in Section 2. However, an analysis of
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how they combined these models by using the regional performance management
tools in different ways and of the related performance results provides some
interesting conclusions.
First, the only region that quite clearly endorsed the ‘choice and competition’
governance model – Lombardy – had a 2012 performance that was above the
national average but was nevertheless worse than in 2007. The ‘choice and com-
petition’ governance model by itself does not seem to be associated with a sus-
tained performance improvement.
Second, regardless of the chosen mix of governance models, it could be that
external benchmarking represents a precondition to sustained improvement.
Rather than exclusively adopting internal benchmarking, a systematic compar-
ison with other providers offers a powerful tool to detect best practices and
organizational ﬂaws. It seems that especially high-performing regions – such as
Lombardy, Emilia Romagna and Friuli Venezia Giulia – might beneﬁt from
comparing themselves with other regions. IRPES can be considered as a starting
point in the performance evaluation process, as it provides information that
individual regions cannot gather by themselves. Internal benchmarking is impor-
tant, but it may not be enough to improve regional performance.
Third, despite the fact that no region has exclusively adopted a ‘transparent
public ranking’ governance model, our analysis suggests that public disclosure of
data can be a powerful tool to drive the improvement in the health care system.
This can be explained by the speciﬁc lever that public disclosure activates: repu-
tation. This can pave the way to the systematic involvement of clinicians in the
improvement process by supporting the identiﬁcation of best practices and peer
review mechanisms.
Fourth, the improvement achieved by two southern regions – Sicily and Basili-
cata – proves that the coherent adoption of appropriate governance models might
help to reduce Italy’s geographical divide.
Further research is needed to understand and analyse if and how the adoption of
different governance models affects regional health care performance, by updating
available data and examining the impacts of the IRPES on newly adhering regions
(Emilia Romagna and Friuli Venezia Giulia).
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